'Financialisation' and 'shareholder value' loom large in the closure of the Vaux Brewery in Sunderland. 'Financialisation' and 'shareholder value' are necessarily intertwined with the geographies of space and place. Geography inevitably enters into assessments of shareholder value by social agents. A geographical political economy approach argues that generalised pressures created by financialisation and shareholder value are mediated and contested by specific and particular configurations of spatialised social relations, social agency and socio-institutional contexts over time, across space and in place. Geographical political economy frames the analysis of the Vaux Brewery closure in Sunderland. A more spatially sensitive, place aware and locally and regionally rooted financial infrastructure may be necessary but not sufficient to underpin local and regional development.
Introduction
After over 160 years of operation, the Vaux Brewery in Sunderland in North East England closed in July 1999. Over three hundred people lost their jobs, many with over two decades of service. The Vaux Brewery was a material part and an iconic symbol close to the metaphorical and physical heart of the The economic and social costs of closure contributed to the North East region's relatively weak and uneven economic growth, persistently high unemployment and lack of home grown, regionally-based companies.
The Vaux Brewery closure in Sunderland begs an explanation and provides a stark illustration of the potential power and local and regional development implications of the geographies of 'financialisation' and 'shareholder value'.
The relative neglect of the economic geographies of money is being incrementally addressed (Martin and Minns 1995; Leyshon and Thrift 1997; Martin 1999; Tickell 2000; Pollard 2003) . However, the intersection and articulation between the circuits of finance and industrial capital and their local and regional development implications has received limited attention (Linge and Schamp 1993; Courlet and Soulage 1995; Martin and Minns 1995; Martin 1999 ). In particular, there are only limited insights into "the nature and processes of firms' exits from markets and the role of irrecoverable sunk costs" (Clark and Wrigley 1997) : 10). This paper seeks to address the gaps in the literature by examining the geographies of 'financialisation' and 'shareholder value'. The geographies of space and place are necessarily intertwined with financialisation and shareholder value. The process of financialisation and the phenomenon of shareholder value take place in an explicitly spatial framework. Geography inevitably enters into the assessments of shareholder value by social agents.
A geographical political economy approach reveals that generalised pressures created by financialisation and shareholder value are mediated and contested by specific and particular configurations of spatialised social relations, social agency and socio-institutional contexts over time, across space and in place. Geographical political economy frames the analysis of the closure of the Vaux Brewery in Sunderland. It explains the disembedding of regional social relations of ownership and control, the corporate quest for relatively higher returns and City support through post-industrial business models, institutional struggles over competing assessments of shareholder value and corporate strategy and the social agency of local and regional interests contesting the closure and dealing with the aftermath. A more spatially sensitive, place aware and locally and regionally rooted financial infrastructure may be necessary but not sufficient to underpin local and regional development.
The Geographies of 'Financialisation' and 'Shareholder Value'
An increasingly finance-driven capitalism has become a markedly more pervasive phenomena reshaping geographies of finance in recent decades (Grahl 2001; Clark 2004 ). Williams explains its emergence as process of "financialization" that: reworks the hierarchy of management objectives as it reorients the firm:
if firms have to organize process and please consumers in the product market, they must also now satisfy professional fund managers and meet the expectations of the capital market. The result is a new form of (financial) competition of all against all whereby every quoted firm must compete as an investment to meet the same standard of financial performance (Williams 2000) : 6).
'Financialised' forms of capitalism have their roots in the crisis of the post-war era of Keynesian welfare capitalism, the retreat of the state and the emergence of neo-liberalism and 'pension fund capitalism' (Clark 1999) . The deregulation and liberalisation of the financial system and corporate governance since the 1980s heralded a 'securitized' era of market development in which commodification and marketisation have reached unprecedented levels (Martin 1999; Leys 2001; FinancialReportingCouncil 2003) . Institutional investors have become dominant shareholders within national equities markets (Table 1) , directing the state-assisted savings boom since the 1960s (Clark 2000) . The power and voice of owners has been reinforced in their principal-agent relationship with management (Christopherson 2002; Clark 2004) . <Table 1 here> For companies, 'financialisation' has established the conditions in which "the financial system now completely dominates the real economy of goods and services" (Martin and Minns 1995: 128) . Industrial capital now has few institutional protections against the "peremptory demands of the stock exchange" (Williams, 2000: 4) . For people, wider private shareholding and personal savings, especially pensions (Blackburn 2003) , have closely connected individuals and households with the financial system (Boyer 2000) .
Social relations and social identities have divided. People can be simultaneously workers and shareholders, directly through share ownership and indirectly through institutions investing their savings (Table 2) . <Table 2 here> 'Shareholder value' has emerged from and contributed to financialised capitalism as the main measure of firm performance and dominant framework for management agency (Williams 2000) . As the "business cliché" and "social mantra" of the 1990s (Froud et al. 2000: 81) and "the investment community's contemporary anthem" (O'Neill 2001: 189) , 'shareholder value' is: not so much a precisely defined concept with a stable place in one discourse or politico-economic system, as a rhetoric which circulates widely and a thematic which can be variably invoked as cause, consequence or justification … [it] has been variously characterized as epochal revolution or mere fad and quite possibly is both (Froud et al., 2000: 81) .
Shareholder value originated in the US in the 1980s amongst a management consultant community attempting to sell value-based systems to publicly quoted companies seeking to increase returns and satisfy (rising) stock market expectations (Rappaport 1998; PAConsulting 2004) . Despite discussion of 'stakeholder capitalism' (Wills 1998; Gamble and Kelly 2001) , 'shareholder value' reinforces the dominance of shareholders as the principal 'stakeholder' with a claim on the firm through the social relations of ownership (Minford 1998) . Management often has a fiduciary duty to maximise financial returns to shareholders legally entrenched in national financial systems. For advocates, shareholder value "will align management and shareholder interests to benefit all stakeholders as shareholding is spread ever wider" (Froud et al., 2000: 86) .
'Shareholder value' is enacted through 'Shareholder Value Added' (SVA) methodologies that assess the 'economic value added' of future corporate activity rather than ex-post reporting. SVA focuses on:
determining the extent of a firm's available (or free) cash flows as the means to pay dividends, meet debt obligations and access capital for new investment opportunities. SVA methodologies construct a powerful accounting and management language which expresses the aspirations of shareholders, ensures the collaboration of managers and acts both as a motivational and a disciplining device throughout the enterprise (O'Neill 2001: 190) .
Expectations of increased returns on capital employed in shorter time periods, perhaps to more than 10% annually with no sectoral exceptions, are typical SVA performance yardsticks (Williams 2000) . With the virulent forces of the capital market via institutional investors more "mobile and rapidly threatening" than the product market through retailers and consumers (Froud et al. 2000: 104) , companies and management often struggle to meet such expectations for returns. Speculative deal-making by impatient investors has often displaced patient interest in longer-term organic growth, reinforcing shorttermism (Martin and Minns 1995; HMTreasury 2001; Blackburn 2002; Hutton 2002 ). Shareholder value's 'speed-up' (Froud et al. 2000) of management work has unleashed a dynamic of perpetual restructuring: resources are shifted to areas where returns can be maximized, making other investments redundant…the break-up of vertically and horizontally integrated firms, discarding or selling poorly performing investments -where the loss of earnings produces higher savings than the cost of capital employed (O'Neill, 2001: 190) .
During a closure, tensions may emerge from such restructuring as "…what worker/shareholders lose through wage cuts could be compensated by the gains of shareholder/workers in asset price appreciation" (Williams 2000: 9) .
Financialisation and shareholder value are necessarily intertwined with the geographies of space and place. Despite growing attention in social science (Froud, Haslam, Johal and Williams 2000; Grahl 2001; Rose and Mejer 2003) and economic geography (O'Neill 2001; Christopherson 2002; Engelen 2003) , the explicitly spatial framework in which the process of financialisation and the phenomenon of shareholder value take place warrant further consideration.
The geographical embeddedness of the financial system is well established (Harvey 1989; Corbridge, Martin and Thrift 1994; Leyshon 1995; Clark and O'Connor 1997; Leyshon and Thrift 1998; Martin 1999; Clark 2004) .
Generalised pressures -such as financialisation and shareholder valueare inevitably reproduced, interpreted and transmitted amongst geographically rooted financial networks with specific spatial structures and particular geographies (Leyshon and Thrift 1997) . Echoing the fallacy of O'Brien's 'end of geography' arguments (O'Brien 1992), finance-driven capitalism may be more autonomous relative to the 'real' economy but it cannot escape its inherently geographical foundations (Harvey 1982; Harvey 1989) . National Such geographical influences can be taken into account to greater or lesser degrees in assessing their relative contributions to shareholder value added (Table 3) . <Table 3 here> Yet, SVA methods are not wholly rationalist and objective. Neither is the 'City of London' a unified, homogenous and faceless entity (Leyshon and Thrift 1997) . SVA contains inherent subjectivity. 'The City' is divided, heterogeneous and works through people and institutions. Analyses, decisions and judgements about shareholder value are articulated in particular ways for specific ends by a range of agents -advisors, analysts, brokers, institutional shareholders or corporate managers (Table 3) . Geographical concerns impinge upon the actions and intentions of social agents in different ways in different times and places. Geographically-framed narratives may be used discursively to influence and shape the agency of institutional investors, companies and other involved interests. Institutional investors in the City of London may seek to portray regional companies as poorly run, underperforming relative to their sectoral peers and ripe for change. Regionallybased management could try to preserve their strategic autonomy despite shareholder dissent. National, regional and local branches of the state may seek to safeguard jobs through regional policy while being unable or unwilling to intervene in the financial affairs of publicly owned companies. Trade unions could be torn between the workplace politics of safeguarding members' jobs and the community politics of their pension fund trustees seeking returns on investment (Harvey 1996) . Local civil society may or may not mobilise successfully to contest the decisions of apparently remote institutional owners.
The geographies of financialisation and shareholder value therefore unfold in uneven ways across the range of inter-dependent, socially constructed and (Goodwin 2004 ), a holistic geographical political economy interprets such concepts as mutually constitutive and enriching. Analysis needs to "…remain sensitive to the fact that however much financial flows and geographies are socially embedded, culturally inflected, discursively mediated, and symbolically inscribed, financial geographies are also geographies of power and are critical in moulding the quality of people's lives" (Tickell 2000: 243) .
The integrated and holistic view of geographical political economy is sensitive to the geographical particularities and material specificities of production, circulation and valorisation recognised by Marx (Smith, Rainnie, Dunford, Hardy, Hudson and Sadler 2002) . Geographical political economy emphasises the actual, potential and emergent role of social agency to acquiesce, contest and/or shape structural forces as they unfold over time, across space and in place. Financialisation and shareholder value do not set in train processions of inevitable events. Co-operation, division and contest are possible concerning assessments of shareholder value and how to achieve it as capital and labour take myriad institutional forms and are differentiated by class, gender, ethnicity, social character and history (Massey 1995; Schoenberger 1997; O'Neill and Gibson-Graham 1999) . Geographical political economy incorporates the socio-institutional context of specific and particular configurations of spatialised social relations and social agency (Sunley 1996; Clark 2004) . Particular national varieties of capitalism endure and mediate generalised pressures in specific and meaningful waysencapsulated in the distinctively uneven geographies of British capitalism, finance-industry relations and the City of London (Thompson 1977; Ingham 1984; Thrift 1994; McDowell 1997) .
As a production facility within a national hotels and managed and tenanted pubs company run from its headquarters in North East England, the Vaux Brewery closure in Sunderland provides an empirical case to examine the geographies of financialisation and shareholder value. The Vaux episode encapsulates the struggle between the divided fractions of finance and industrial capital, the social agency of capital, labour, the state and civil society and the socio-institutional context of finance-industry relations between the City of London and a provincial firm in an old industrial region in the periphery of Britain. Geographical political economy utilises empirical research to reveal the particular articulations of contested, restructured and/or reproduced spatialised social relations, the mobilisation and articulation of social agency and the shaping of socio-institutional context over time, across space and in place (Fagan and Le Heron 1994; Allen et al. 1998; Sayer 2000) .
Analysis examines the incremental and sequential nature of corporate decision-making (Clark and Wrigley 1997: 343) , the contested financial narratives situated in specific socio-institutional contexts (O'Neill 2003; Yeung 2003) , the critical role of City analysts in producing 'financial knowledges' (Wrigley, Currah and Wood 2003) and "costs and cash" (Sayer 1997): 22) .
The research comprised analysis of semi-structured interviews with key agents (e.g. management, trade unions, and institutional shareholders) and published and unpublished secondary materials (e.g. reports and accounts).
Calling Time on Wearside: The Closure of the Vaux Brewery in Sunderland
The Vaux Brewery produced beer distributed through managed and tenanted pubs in the North East and Yorkshire and Swallow Hotels nationally. By the late 1990s, it operated as the brewing and distribution division within The Swallow Group that employed nearly 7,000 nationally, including 3,000 in (Figure 1 ). Pubs and hotels worked contra-cyclically to support corporate growth (Nicholson, 2003) . By the late 1990s, The Swallow Group was a vertically integrated brewing, hotel, managed and tenanted pubs business, including the Vaux, Sunderland, and Wards, Sheffield, breweries. <Figure 1 here> Brewing's increasing capital and scale intensity generated investment capital needs beyond the reach of retained earnings or, in a threadbare regional capital market, North East regional investors. Mirroring the historical loss of financial independence to London (Martin and Minns 1995) , capital demand drew the company into the City's capital markets. By 1999, Swallow had approximately 12,000 shareholders, including 8,000 private individuals and 2,000 employees. None held a controlling share. Fifteen institutional shareholders owned over two thirds of Swallow, concentrated amongst two of the City's largest fund managers (Table 4) . Down from a historic high of 50%, the remainder were often small shareholders, many based in North East England. In the late 1970s, a typically paternalistic employee share ownership scheme issued 6% of the final share capital and made 66% of employees 'worker/shareholders', although many sold their shares immediately. The Nicholsons owned less than 1% of Swallow. Annual dividends, low risk and steady performance meant index tracking pension funds held shares, including those of the Vaux employees. 
Social agency and socio-institutional context I: the boardroom struggleclosure versus Management Buy-Out (MBO)
As City sentiment turned against brewing, investors scrutinised Swallow's strategic juncture and "sought information rather than attempting to wield a big For both the institutional investor and the corporate financier, shortterm shareholder value is their life's blood…It often seems that they forget that it is people out there, making widgets or beers, running pubs or hotels, that actually make the profits, in the long term, not the short term wheeling and dealing…Their worship at the altar of 'shareholder value' leads all too often to short termist pressures on the companies they invest in (Nicholson 2003: 189, 204, 155) . Service 'Job Shop', press reports suggested "less than half" and labelled it a scandal (The Journal, 2 July 1999). …profitability is not a technical, objective term but is specifically related to the structure of British capitalism, the role of financial institutions, and their ability to concentrate on short-term returns. Profitability is political (Minns 1982) : 48).
Reflecting historic issues of unreliable accounting (Cooper and Hopper 1988) and recent post-Enron unease about the probity of financial reporting (Blackburn 2002) , the Vaux Group accounts (1998) register a brewing division profit of £4.3m. The Swallow Group accounts (1999) show losses of £2.6m (1998) and £3.4m (1999) explained by reducing the higher internal transfer price to 'market levels'. Confirming the brewing division's contested profitability, the independent auditors did not sign off this page of the accounts.
Sir Paul Nicholson's (2003) analysis of the closure's actual proceeds and costs reveals the out-turn was over £15m less than BTAB estimated (Table 5, total Col. 2 less total Col. 3). The gap between the value of the final MBO proposal and closure/asset disposal was claimed to be £31.4m but this was based on over £15m of over-estimated proceeds. The real difference was closer to £15m -only £5m more than the £10m difference the Swallow Board publicly claimed would have been acceptable. The City adviser's estimate contained £15m of 'shareholder value' that failed to materialise. Such decentralised 'financial localism' may only be a necessary rather than sufficient support to local and regional development, however, due to its ambiguous relationship with economic growth, questionable scope and sustainability and susceptibility to financial crises (Martin 1999; Tickell 2000) . 
